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CAVEAT VENDITOR: FAILURE TO HEED
INSTRUCTIONS IS NOT A DEFENSE TO
ILLINOIS PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS-THOMAS V.
KAISER AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS
Although assumption of risk is recognized as a valid defense in strict
products liability actions,' it has been criticized by some scholars as being
unduly harsh to genuinely injured plaintiffs, 2 and its application in the area
of products liability has been sporadic and confused at best.3  In the recent
case of Thomas v. Kaiser Agricultural Chemicals,4 where a plaintiff failed to
follow clear and adequate written instructions for operating dangerous farm
equipment, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted a narrow and conservative
view of assumption of risk. The majority held that the plaintiff's ignorance of
the danger of disregarding safety instructions, as well as his failure to volun-
tarily expose himself to a known danger, 5 compelled it to reject the defense of
assumption of risk.
1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 102, at 671 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PRossER]. The defense of assumption of risk has had a tumultuous history. It originated
in master and servant situations where employers asserted that injured workmen were barred
recovery due to the provisions of their work contracts. Eventually this concept was extended to
other situations, oftentimes under such aliases as "incurred risk" or "volenti non fit injuria";
however, the defense remained the same. Id. § 68, at 439-40. Illinois has accepted this defense in
the area of products liability. E.g. Reese v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R., 55 Ill. 2d 356,
360, 303 N.E.2d 382, 385 (1973) (court acknowledged defense of assumption of risk though it did
not apply where employee was unaware of danger of suspended crane bucket); Williams v.
Brown Mfg. Co., 45 11. 2d 418, 430, 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970) (assumption of risk may be
employed where plaintiff disregards instructions on the proper use of a trencher machine).
2. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 68, at 454. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory
Notes ch. 17A, at 70-87 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1963). The American Law Institute members argued
the merits of incorporating the defense of implied assumption of risk into the Second Restate-
ment. The arguments centered on whether the concept of implied assumption of risk was
necessary as a separate defense. The "Confederates" -those scholars in favor of the abolition of
assumption of risk-asserted that this concept could be dealt with in terms ? f either contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff or lack of duty on the part of the defendant. Id. at 78.
Implied assumption of risk was, however, eventually incorporated into the Second Restatement
as § 496D.
3. See Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122 (1961)
(classifying assumption of risk in six categories: express, subjectively consensual, objectively
consensual, by consent to conduct or condition, associational, and imposed). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A, Comment d (1965) (stating that the defenses of assumption of
risk and contributory negligence frequently overlap and are often imprecisely distinguished by
the courts).
4. 81 I11. 2d 206, 407 N.E.2d 32 (1980).
5. Id. at 214, 407 N.E.2d at 36.
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A REVIEW OF STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY
LAW IN ILLINOIS
Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case
A cause of action for strict products liability in Illinois must be supported
by three allegations:" that injury or damage resulted from a defect of the
product, that the product was in an unreasonably dangerous condition due
to this defect, and that the defective condition existed at the time the product
left the manufacturer's control. 7 By imposing these requirements, the Illi-
nois Supreme Court shifted the emphasis away from the traditional duty-
conduct analysis utilized in negligence cases toward one focusing upon the
product itself." Despite this difference in emphasis, both strict liability and
6. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965) (first Illinois case to
use the modern theory of strict liability in the area of commercial products). In Suvada, the
owners of a tractor sued the tractor manufacturer and the manufacturer of a brake system when
a brake malfunction caused a collision with a bus. The court held the manufacturers liable
because the product was in an unreasonably dangerous defective condition at the time the
product left the manufacturer's control. Id. at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
The adoption of strict products liability in Illinois was part of a trend beginning with the
landmark decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963) (plaintiff successfully brought strict products liability suit for injury
stemming from defect in a wood lathe). One year later, the American Law Institute adopted the
revolutionary Restatement § 402A which embraced the theory of strict liability in tort for
defective products. This section provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Section 402A was touted by most scholars as a major breakthrough in the area of products
liability. Foremost among the supporters was Dean Prosser, who described in great detail the
policy considerations and the advantages of this new theory. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel,
50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966). There are, however, occasional criticisms of § 402A. One article
contended that the members of the American Law Institute exceeded their authority by creating
new law, rather than simply reporting the existing law, because at the time
§ 402A was adopted, only seven states had applied strict liability to defective product cases.
Defense Research Institute, Inc., Brief Opposing Strict Liability in Tort, 2, 3, 5 (1966). This
argument, however, had little impact upon the courts; the new theory was adopted by a vast
majority of the states within the same decade. PRossma, supra note 1, § 98, at 657-58.
7. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 623, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (1965).
8. This paramount distinction between negligence theory and strict liability theory was
acknowledged in Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 161, 390 N.E.2d 859, 862 (1979) (quoting
Kerns v. Engelke, 54 Ill. App. 3d 323, 329, 369 N.E.2d 1284, 1289 (5th Dist. 1977)). In Kerns,
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negligence are limited by the requirement that the person using the product
and the use to which the product is employed must have been reasonably
foreseeable to the manufacturer. 9 In this regard, the court has merged a
part of negligence analysis into modern strict liability theory.
Much strict product liability litigation has centered on the question of
whether the product was in an unreasonably dangerous defective condition.
The definition adopted generally in Illinois is whether "the product fail[s] to
perform in a manner reasonably to be expected in light of [its] nature and
intended function."' 0 An actual defect in the product can be demonstrated
the Illinois Supreme Court noted the lack of a securing mechanism on a forage blower and held
the manufacturer liable solely on the basis of this defective design.
Professor Leon Green's influential article, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A
Decade of Litigation, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1185 (1976), discusses these sections from a slightly
different viewpoint, contending that they are quite similar to the standard negligence theory.
Section 402B of the Restatement imposes strict liability for physical harm to the consumer
resulting from public misrepresentation of the character or quality of the chattel sold. Professor
Green asserts that § 402A and § 402B are similar to the typical negligence analysis, but observes
that an additional duty is imposed under strict liability to inform and give reliable information
concerning the product. Id. at 1188.
Professor Green further demonstrates that the basic issues relevant under a strict liability
theory could be presented in a standard negligence analysis. The first issue, causal connection,
considers whether a defective product substantially contributed to the consumer's injury. Id. at
1197-1200. The second issue, the duty of the seller, is based on the premise that every seller owes
a duty to prevent unreasonably dangerous defective products, or non-defective dangerous prod-
ucts lacking adequate warnings, from being placed into the stream of commerce. Id. at 1200-02.
The standard of care is determined by asking whether the product would meet the reasonable
safety expectations of the buying public. Id. at 1203-05. The final issue, breach of this standard,
is measured not by what was expected, but by what the ultimate consumer actually received. Id.
at 1202-06. Thus, Professor Green concludes that § 402A may become simply another variation
of the well-established negligence theory because the same issues and factors are employed under
both. Id. at 1220.
9. Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill. 2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974) (manufacturer of forage wagon
not liable when injury to four year old girl standing near moving conveyor belt was deemed
"unforeseeable"); Prince v. Galis Mfg. Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 374 N.E.2d 1318 (3d Dist.
1978) (court affirmed grant of summary judgment for manufacturer when experienced coal
miner assumed risk of injury from roofbolter machine he had used for three months before his
injury); Doran v. Pullman Standard Mfg. Co., 45 I11. App. 3d 981, 360 N.E.2d 440 (1st Dist.
1970) (summary judgment for railroad car manufacturer reversed because evidence presented
showed that the danger of a moving railroad car might have been reasonably foreseeable to the
manufacturer). This foreseeability requirement utilizes an objective standard as almost every
consequence is conceivable in retrospect. Mieher v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 539, 544, 301 N.E.2d 307,
309 (1973) (judgment entered for truck manufacturer; court ruled it highly extraordinary that
lack of a rear bumper brought about a fatal car crash).
10. Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 I11. 2d 339, 342, 247 N.E.2d 401, 403
(1969) (judgment entered against manufacturer when hammer chipped while being used in a
customary manner). Accord, Knapp v. Hertz Corp., 59 Ill. App. 3d 241, 375 N.E.2d 1349 (1st
Dist. 1978) (judgment entered against lessor of auto with brakes in an unreasonably dangerous
condition despite fact that plaintiff drove with the emergency brake partially engaged). This
brief definition, however, often necessitates a complicated balancing process for fact-finders.
Although no criteria are specifically articulated, some of the factors scrutinized have included:
the probability of injury; the seriousness of injury; the availability of safer alternative products;
the feasibility of eliminating the dangerous characteristic either through warnings or physical
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in three ways. The manufacturer's liability may be predicated upon a defect
in the manufacturing process, a defect in the product's design," or a failure
to warn adequately of the danger in an even faultlessly manufactured and
designed product. 2 Although a defect is an essential ingredient of a plain-
tiff's cause of action, proof of a specific defect is not always required.'
3
Courts frequently permit reasonable inferences to be drawn rather than
impose difficult matters of proof on the plaintiff.14
The Defense of Assumption of Risk
After proving a prima facie products liability case, the plaintiff must
withstand any defenses raised. Significantly, in Williams v. Brown Manufac-
turing Co.,' 5 the Illinois Supreme Court decided that promoting the policy
alterations; the obviousness of the danger; the common knowledge and normal public expecta-
tions of the danger; and the social utility of the product. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of
Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965).
11. A defect in design, as alleged in Thomas, requires analysis of all of the factors discussed
within the "unreasonably dangerous" issue. See note 10 supra. One case discussing these factors
is Lolie v. Ohio Bass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1974), where a power cable fell from the
roof of a mine shaft. Applying Illinois law, the court analyzed: (1) whether the design of the
product made it incapable of preventing injury; (2) whether there was an alternative design
which would have prevented injury; and (3) the feasibility, in terms of cost and technology, of
the alternative design. See also Anderson v. Hyster, 74 Ill. 2d 364, 368, 385 N.E.2d 690, 692
(1979). In Anderson, the court held the manufacturer liable because a defective forklift was used
in a foreseeable fashion and injury resulted. The court stated that design standards of the
industry, or criteria set by legislation or governmental agencies, are relevant in determining
whether a defect in design exists. Id.
12. Stanfield v. Medalist Indus., Inc., 34 Ill. App. 3d 635, 639, 340 N.E.2d 276, 279 (1st
Dist. 1975) (summary judgment for manufacturer reversed because allegations of defective
design and lack of adequate warnings raised question for jury); Haugen v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 387, 550 P.2d 71, 76 (1976) (manufacturer of grinding disc liable
when consumer was not adequately informed of safe way to use product).
13. Knapp v. Hertz Corp., 59 111. App. 3d 241, 246, 375 N.E.2d 1349, 1354 (1st Dist. 1978)
(brakes of rental car malfunctioned on highway; lessor liable even though plaintiff presented no
evidence as to the cause of the malfunction); Tweedy v. Wright Ford Sales, Inc., 31111. App. 3d
72, 76, 334 N.E.2d 417, 420 (4th Dist.) (plaintiff not required to prove a specific identifiable
defect other than the uncontroverted malfunction of the auto's brake system), aff'd, 64 I11. 2d
570, 357 N.E.2d 449 (1976).
14. See PiosssE, supra note 1, § 103, at 672-75. Dean Prosser acknowledges that although
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has no application in strict liability theory, inferences can sustain
a plaintiff's burden of proof. Prosser observes that an inference based on pure conjecture will not
be permitted to stand; yet, if established by a preponderance of probability, the issue will be one
for the jury to determine. Id. Contra, Russo v. The Range, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 3d 236, 238-39, 395
N.E.2d 10, 13 (1st Dist. 1979) (summary judgment for amusement park reversed as evidence did
not clearly show that plaintiff possessed knowledge of risk of injury from slide).
15. 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970). The Williams court was confronted with a strict
liability suit in which the plaintiff sustained injuries while using a trencher machine. The
complaint alleged that the trencher should have been equipped with a safety device to alleviate
the force amassed when the machine encountered an unmovable obstruction. The defendant
manufacturer, on the other hand, presented evidence that the plaintiff read an instruction
booklet which contained directions on how to adjust the machine to prevent a sudden lurch
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considerations previously advanced in Suvada v. White Motor Co.'6 meant
disallowing contributory negligence as a defense to strict liability." The
court demanded that a defense contemplate a higher degree of culpability on
the plaintiff's part, concluding that assumption of risk satisfied this stand-
ard. 8 Moreover, assumption of risk implies a willingness to embrace a
known danger; it thus differs from contributory negligence in its focus on the
plaintiff's mental state rather than his or her conduct.' 9 When a plaintiff
assumes the risk, he or she relieves the defendant's duty by explicitly or
implicitly stating20 that he or she will accept the chance of injury from a
known risk. 2' Even if a product is dangerously defective, the defendant is
relieved of liability by this conscious decision to accept the danger. 22
when an object lodged in the digging mechanism. The trial judge struck the defense of assump-
tion of risk, but the Illinois Supreme Court overruled, and remanded the case on the ground that
the evidence on assumption of risk was sufficient for submission to the jury. Id. at 431, 261
N.E.2d at 312.
16. 32 111. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965). In Suvada, the Illinois Supreme Court
justified the imposition of strict liability for defective products by emphasizing the interest in
promoting public safety. The court reasoned that because manufacturers represent their prod-
ucts to be safe and reap profits from their sale, manufacturers should be compelled to accept the
responsibility for defective products distributed in the marketplace. Id. at 186.
Further vindication of this policy consideration is found in Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell
Mfg. Co., 42 I11. 2d 339, 344, 247 N.E.2d 401, 404 (1969), where the court averred that strict
liability would offer manufacturers an incentive to enhance product safety. Another rationale
was enunciated in Brandenburg v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., 162 Mont. 506, 513-14, 513
P.2d 268, 273 (1973), where the court recognized that manufacturers have the ability to
anticipate some hazards and guard against their occurrence, whereas consumers have relatively
little power to do so.
17. 45 I11. 2d at 427, 261 N.E.2d at 310. This conclusion has been reached in most strict
liability cases. J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LAW § 32.94, at 384-85 (1977). E.g., Reese v. Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R., 55 I11. 2d 356, 360, 303 N.E.2d 382, 385 (1973) (contributory
negligence of plaintiff standing beneath suspended crane bucket did not bar his strict products
liability claim); Karabatos v. Spivey Co., 49 Ill. App. 3d 317, 322, 364 N.E.2d 319, 322 (1st
Dist. 1977) (employee injured by conveyor belt rollers was awarded damages; simple contribu-
tory negligence did not bar his strict liability suit). Likewise, a plaintiff may still pursue a strict
liability claim although contributorily negligent in failing to discover a defect. Williams v.
Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I11. 2d 418, 423, 261 N.E.2d 305, 308 (1970); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRs § 402A, Comment n (1965).
18. 45 Ill. 2d at 425, 261 N.E.2d at 309.
19. PaossER, supra note 1, § 68, at 447.
20. Id. Plaintiffs rarely verbalize that they have assumed a risk.
21. Id. at 440. See Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv.
122 (1961) (describing the various forms of assumption of risk courts have recognized).
22. See Twerski, Old Wine in a New Flask-Restructuring Assumption of Risk in the
Products Liability Era, 60 IowA L. REv. 1, 16-25 (1974) (author discusses the defendant's duty to
guard against plaintiffs who did not make conscious choices to encounter danger). See also
Keeton, Assumption of Risk in Products Liability Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122 (1961). Keeton
contends that the defense of assumption of risk should be limited to situations where the plaintiff
communicates his or her consent to accept the risk or where the risk is obvious to all consumers.
Keeton disapproves of the more subtle forms of assumption of risk (such as consent through
conduct) that often operate to deny recovery for a genuine claim. Id. at 164.
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In Illinois, assumption of risk is an affirmative defense 23 on which the
defendant carries the burden of proof. The defendant must plead and prove
that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the risk, understood and appreci-
ated the danger, and voluntarily and unreasonably exposed himself or herself
to the risk.2 4 Unlike the test for contributory negligence or for misuse, this
standard is subjective. It requires the trier of fact, usually a jury, 25 to
ascertain the thoughts of the individual plaintiff, rather than rely upon the
objective standard of the reasonably prudent person. 2  The jury need not,
however, determine this issue solely on the basis of the plaintiff's testimony;
rather, the jurors may look at all the evidence presented, including the
plaintiff's age, experience, knowledge and understanding, and the obvious-
ness of the danger itself.2 7 If upon weighing all these factors the jury can
only conclude that the plaintiff was aware of the hazard, 2 then the fact-
finder is bound to decide that the plaintiff did indeed assume the risk.2 9
23. Court v. Grzelinski, 72 I11. 2d 141, 149, 379 N.E.2d 281, 284 (1978) (court recognized
assumption of risk as a valid defense, but held manufacturer liable for injuries from defective gas
tank as fireman did not assume the risk); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I11. 2d 418, 430, 261
N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970) (judgment for plaintiff overturned and case remanded for new trial
because trial judge struck the affirmative defense of assumption of risk).
24. Sweeney v. Max A.R. Matthews & Co., 46 I11. 2d 64, 66, 264 N.E.2d 170, 171 (1970)
(assumption of risk not found where journeyman carpenter was unaware of danger of defective
concrete nails); Ruggeri v, Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 63 I11. App. 3d 525, 530, 380 N.E.2d
445, 448-49 (5th Dist. 1978) (judgment entered against manufacturer where conscientious
employee was not aware of the dangerous propensities of a flammable adhesive); Ralston v.
Illinois Power Co., 13 Ill. App. 3d 95, 98, 299 N.E.2d 497, 499 (4th Dist. 1973) (workman
standing on dangerous hydraulic boring attachment found to have assumed risk). See also
ILLINOIS PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) § 400.03 (West Supp. 1977) (stating the known risk
must be a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries but not mentioning the requirement that the
plaintiff must have voluntarily and unreasonably assumed the risk of injury).
The Restatement acknowledges that different jurisdictions use the term in different senses.
One of the areas of disagreement concerns the reasonableness of the plaintiff's decision to
encounter the risk. One alternative presented by the Restatement is that assumption of risk
applies even where the plaintiff's decision to chance the risk is reasonable because he has
consented to accept the danger. The other alternative is that the decision to chance the risk must
be unreasonable in light of the circumstances in order to bar the plaintiff's claim. The Restate-
ment has adopted this latter alternative as its position. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 496A, Comment c, 496D (1965).
25. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 430, 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970). The
Restatement maintains that the standard is subjective, based on the knowledge, appreciation,
and understanding of the particular plaintiff. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D, Com-
ment c (1965).
26. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I11. 2d 418, 430, 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970).
27. Id. at 430-31, 261 N.E.2d at 312. The Restatement provides: "[T]he plaintiff's own
testimony as to what he knew, understood, or appreciated is not necessarily conclusive. There
are some risks as to which no adult will be believed if he says that he did not know or understand
them." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D, Comment d (1965).
28. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 I11. 2d 418, 430-31, 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970).
29. Plaintiff still may counter this defense. If, for instance, the plaintiff is given assurances
by the defendant that the defect in the product is either trivial or harmless, the defense of
assumption of risk will not bar the plaintiff's recovery. PRossER, supra note 1, § 68, at 450. See
Collins v. Musgrave, 28 I11. App. 3d 307, 313, 328 N.E.2d 649, 653 (5th Dist. 1975) (plaintiff
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Thus, the defense of assumption of risk is available to Illinois defendants
even in cases where the plaintiff expressly denies any knowledge concerning
a dangerous defect in a product.
THE THOMAS DECISION
Background
While attempting to fill a fertilizer applicator, 30 the plaintiff, Ronald D.
Thomas, suffered serious injury to his eye when liquid nitrogen fertilizer
sprayed into his face. 3' Thomas' injury occurred after he inadvertently
opened the air pressure relief valve on the applicator, thereby releasing
pent-up pressure and the remaining liquid fertilizer. Seeking recovery under
both strict liability and negligence theories, Thomas sued Kaiser Agricultural
Chemicals, the vendor of the liquid fertilizer and the supplier of the applica-
tor, as well as Certified Equipment & Manufacturing Company, the distrib-
utor of an allegedly defective attachment called an adaptor. 32
At trial, Thomas was able to establish his prima facie'case in strict liability
through the unchallenged testimony of his expert witness. 33  Kaiser
attempted to counter plaintiff's case by raising the defense that as a matter of
law plaintiff had assumed the risk of the alleged defect in design. 34 Signifi-
cantly, Thomas testified that he had read the conspicuous and detailed
warning label cautioning users to bleed off all the air pressure in the tank
found not to assume risk of defective axle where defendant gave implicit assurances that repairs
were complete).
30. 81 111. 2d at 209, 407 N.E.2d at 34.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 209-10, 407 N.E.2d at 34. Certified subsequently brought a third-party complaint
against Dover Corporation, the manufacturer of the adaptor. Kaiser counterclaimed for indem-
nity against both Certified and Dover. Id. at 210, 407 N.E.2d at 34. Prior to the commencement
of the trial, the court entered summary judgment in favor of Certified and against Dover for
indemnity for any liability which plaintiff or Kaiser might recover against Certified. Thomas v.
Kaiser Agricultural Chems., 74 I11. App. 3d 522, 523, 392 N.E.2d 1141, 1144 (4th Dist. 1979).
33. The expert concluded that the stem of the relief valve protruded approximately one-
eighth inch beyond the lip of the adaptor and that this protrusion allowed for the dangerous
possibility of accidentally bumping and opening the relief valve. 81 Ill. 2d at 213, 407 N.E.2d at
35.
34. Id. at 210, 407 N.E.2d at 34. Kaiser also argued that as a matter of law it was entitled to
indemnity from Certified because under a strict liability theory liability extends to all members
in the distribution chain, including the wholesaler as well as the retailer. Id. at 214, 407 N.E.2d
at 36. The supreme court, however, rejected this contention. The court noted that the jury
instructions tendered by Kaiser concerning this question of liability allowed the jury to hold in
favor of one defendant, but not the other. Since those instructions had in fact been presented to
the jury, the defendant was held to have waived all rights to appeal the instruction. Id. at 215,
407 N.E.2d at 36. Support for this ruling is found in the decision of Tweedy v. Wright Motor
Sales, Inc., 64 Ill. 2d 570, 575, 357 N.E.2d 449, 452 (1976), in which the Illinois Supreme Court
stated that if the forms of verdict are submitted to the jury without objection, any alleged errors
are waived.
484 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:477
before refilling the applicator.35 Thomas had attempted to refill the appli-
cator without verifying that the air pressure gauge read "zero," as the
instructions directed.36  Further, Kaiser presented evidence that Thomas
had been a farmer for eighteen years and had fertilized his fields and those of
his neighbors for the past: sixteen years. 37  It was also shown that Thomas
had used a substantially similar apparatus during this period and that he had
used an identical applicator once before. 3
The trial ended with a judgment entered on the jury verdict in favor of
Thomas and against Kaiser, 39 and the appellate court affirmed. 40  With
regard to Kaiser's defense of assumption of risk, the appellate court held that
although the plaintiff had read the safety instructions, the facts did not
warrant the conclusion that he appreciated the danger of unintentionally
opening the relief valve stem. 4'
The Supreme Court's Opinion
The Illinois Supreme Court upheld the rulings of the lower courts. 41 Mr.
Justice Moran, writing for the majority, stated that the defense of assump-
35. 81 I11. 2d at 212, 407 N.E.2d at 35.
36. Id.
37. Thomas v. Kaiser Agricultural Chems., 74 Ill. App. 3d at 526, 392 N.E.2d at 1145.
38. Brief for Defendant at 13, Thomas v. Kaiser Agricultural Chems., 81 111. 2d 206, 407
N.E.2d 32 (1980). The undisputed testimony of a witness called by the plaintiff indicated that
the mechanical structure of the relief valve would be completely apparent to any user of the
machine. Id. at 16.
Kaiser's argument was that the plaintiff assumed the risk of any injury because the danger of
pressure escaping should have been patently obvious to a professional farmer with 18 years of
experience. Furthermore, Kaiser asserted that Thomas should have been aware of this hazard
because the applicator's warning label explicitly advised of the danger of this very occurrence.
Id. at 15. Finally, Kaiser contended that the factfinder can disregard the plaintiff's testimony if
other evidence indicates that the plaintiff must have been aware of the danger. See notes 26-29
and accompanying text supra.
Dover, the third-party defendant, raised its own defense that the apparatus used by the
plaintiff was neither defectively manufactured nor defectively designed. Instead, Dover asserted
that the danger arose because the assembler, Kaiser, chose an unsuitable combination of compo-
nents. 81 I11. 2d at 215, 407 N.E.2d at 36.
39. 81111. 2d at 210, 407 N.E.2d at 34. The trial court also held in favor of Certified against
both the plaintiff and Kaiser, and in favor of Kaiser against Dover for complete indemnity for
Kaiser's liability to Thomas. Id. In a post-trial order, the trial court awarded attorney's fees and
costs in favor of Certified and against Dover in the sum of $7079.67. 74 Ill. App. 3d at 524, 392
N.E.2d at 1144.
40. The appellate court, however, reversed the awards of attorney's fees and costs to Certi-
fied. 74 I11. App. 3d at 530, 392 N.E.2d at 1148. This issue was not raised on the appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court.
41. Id. at 527, 392 N.E.2d at 1146. As to Dover's argument concerning the improper
assembly of the applicator, the appellate court held that the manner of Kaiser's assembly of the
apparatus was indeed contemplated by Dover. Hence, since Kaiser's actions were foreseeable,
Dover was not allowed to maintain the defense of misuse, and accordingly was held liable to
Kaiser for indemnity. From this judgment Dover petitioned for a hearing before the Illinois
Supreme Court. Id. at 530, 392 N.E.2d at 1148.
42. 81 Il. 2d at 218, 407 N.E.2d at 38.
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tion of risk would apply only if the plaintiff was subjectively aware of the
danger of the relief valve. According to the court, however, a finding of
awareness was not warranted by the evidence presented. Although the plain-
tiff had been a farmer for eighteen years, the majority emphasized that
Thomas had used this particular machine only once before. 43 Furthermore,
on that occasion he had used anhydrous-ammonia fertilizer which has prop-
erties markedly different from those of liquid nitrogen. 4  Moreover, the
court stated that although the plaintiff may have been contributorily negli-
gent45 in not checking the air pressure gauge, his actions did not indicate a
voluntary decision to face the danger.46 Therefore, the jury was free to
decide against Kaiser on the issue of assumption of risk.47
43. Id. at 214, 407 N.E.2d at 36.
44. Id.
45. As previously discussed, see note 17 and accompanying text supra, contributory negli-
gence is no defense to a cause of action in strict liability.
46. 81 111. 2d at 214, 407 N.E.2d at 36.
47. The contention of the third-party defendant, Dover, that the danger arose solely because
the assembler chose an unsuitable combination of component parts, was also rejected by the
supreme court. First, the court held that when an assembler makes no substantial alteration in
the component parts and the injury is causally traced to a defect in manufacture or design,
liability remains with the manufacturer. Id. at 215, 407 N.E.2d at 36-37. This reasoning is
supported by the Restatement which provides: "[W]here there is no change in the component
part itself, but it is merely incorporated into something larger, the strict liability will be found to
carry through to the ultimate user or consumer." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A,
Comment q (1965).
The court's handling of this misuse issue is consistent with prior Illinois decisions. In Suvada v.
White Motor Co., 32 111. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), the court held that the manufacturer of
a brake system was liable where defendant merely installed the brakes. Also, in Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Williams Mach. & Tool Co., 62 Ill. 2d 77, 338 N.E.2d 857 (1975), the court stated
that the manufacturer of a defective hydraulic pump release valve was liable for injuries
resulting from the collapse of a hydraulic scaffold. Although the scaffold was placed too close to
a building, the court ruled that this was not misuse because the sole purpose of the release valve
was to prevent this very accident. Id. at 84, 338 N.E.2d at 861. The supreme court held, in both
of these cases, that the defect was still directly attributable to the toolings and designs of the
original manufacturer.
The second basis for overruling Dover's contention concerned the foreseeability of Kaiser's
actions. It had been established by the Illinois Supreme Court that misuse would bar the
recovery of the plaintiff, if, and only if, such use is not objectively reasonably foreseeable.
Hence, in the decision of Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 390 N.E.2d 859 (1979), the court held
that a manufacturer of a forage blower may be liable for injury caused by a foreseeable
nonintended use of the product. This is also supported by the decision in Anderson v. Hyster Co.,
74 Ill. 2d 364, 385 N.E.2d 690 (1979), where a manufacturer was held liable when a defective
forklift was used in a foreseeable, though dangerous, manner by an employee. Thus, although
Kaiser's selection of component parts was questionable, its combination of parts was reasonably
foreseeable. Therefore, the court was justified in holding Dover liable for the injuries incurred.
81 Ill. 2d at 215-17, 407 N.E.2d at 37.
Finally, in the decision of Doran v. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. App. 3d 981, 987,
360 N.E.2d 440, 445 (1st Dist. 1977), the court emphasized that when multiple causes combine
to produce the injury, the liability of the manufacturer will be severed only if the acts of others
were unforeseeable. This normally is a question for the jury. In Thomas, therefore, the court was
correct in ruling that it was within the power of the jury to conclude that Kaiser's misuse was
foreseeable to Dover. The jury's decision was properly allowed to stand.
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In his dissent, Justice Ryan contended that plaintiff's complete disregard
of the express warning concerning the proper use of the applicator was a
clear example of assumption of risk. 48 The dissent asserted that because the
plaintiff had read the safety instructions prior to the accident and had
extensive farming experience, the majority should have concluded that
Thomas knew of the danger associated with the use of this fertilizer.
41
Furthermore, because it was undisputed that Thomas did not check the air
pressure before he attempted to refill the applicator, 50 and because no injury
would have occurred had he followed the directions, 5' the dissent contended
that the defense of assumption of risk should have barred the plaintiff's
recovery as a matter of law.
ANALYSIS OF THE THOMAS DECISION
AND SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE HOLDINGS
The major issue faced by the Illinois Supreme Court in Thomas was the
legal implication of the plaintiff's failure to heed express instructions on the
proper operation of a fertilizer applicator. Although the majority opinion
contended that Thomas did not assume the risk of injury, this holding is not
in accordance with a substantial number of decisions in this area. Further-
more, in factual situations analogous to the present case, courts have entered
judgments in favor of defendants based on findings either that plaintiff
misused the product or that the product was simply not in an unreasonably
dangerous condition when injury occurred. These latter alternatives were
not discussed in the Thomas opinion and, therefore, remain viable defenses
which may be used in future cases similar to Thomas.
The Defense of Assumption of Risk
Stressing that the plaintiff in Thomas was neither aware of the inherent
danger nor voluntarily proceeded to face this danger, the majority opinion
demonstrates that the court has decided to take a very narrow view of the
assumption of risk doctrine, and, in doing so has effectively eliminated the
use of this defense for Illinois manufacturers. 52 The court's restrictive posi-
tion on assumption of risk is displayed by its refusal to find, as it might have,
that the plaintiff must have been aware of the risk5 3 and its consequent
failure to rule, as it could have, that the evidence on the question of assump-
'tion of risk so overwhelmingly favored the defendant that the contrary
verdict could not be permitted to stand.5 4 Numerous cases illustrate that a
48. 81 Il. 2d at 218, 407 N.E.2d at 38 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 220-21, 407 N.E.2d at 39.
52. For an analysis of the economic impact of Thomas, see notes 110-125 and accompanying
text infra.
53. See notes 42-47 and accompanying text supra.
54. Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R., 37 I11. 2d 494, 511, 229 N.E.2d 504, 513-14 (1967).
This standard has been upheld in subsequent decisions. See Kudelka v. American Hoist &
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court may rule as a matter of law on assumption of risk when the plaintiff's
awareness has been shown, either through his or her own prior complaints
about the dangerousness, 5 through warnings of others,56 or through experi-
encing similar difficulties prior to the accident.5 7 To demonstrate that the
court in Thomas should have ruled for the defendant in the instant case,
some discussion of Illinois case law is necessary.
The manner in which a plaintiff becomes aware, or should have become
aware, of a danger should have no bearing on the court's analysis as long as it
can be shown that the plaintiff did, in fact, receive a warning. It should
make no difference whether the plaintiff is warned verbally, 58 or through
explicit instructions, as in the Thomas case. The crucial factor is that the
plaintiff was warned. Accordingly, he or she should not be allowed to claim
ignorance of the danger.
This reasoning has been followed in prior decisions. In Williams v. Brown
Manufacturing Co.,51 for example, the Illinois Supreme Court remanded the
case because evidence that the injured plaintiff had read and understood
instructions was presented, but not admitted at trial. 0 The crux of the
Williams opinion was that the presence of instructions is an indispensable
factor to be included in the jury's deliberation. And, as previously stated, the
Illinois Supreme Court is not bound to accept the jury's verdict in all cases,
but may overturn a judgment whenever all the evidence overwhelmingly
favors a contrary result. 6 1 A second case, Sweeney v. Max A.R. Matthews
Derrick Co., 541 F.2d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 1976) (applying Illinois law) (directed verdict for
defendant overturned where misuse of crane outriggers was not supported by overwhelming
evidence); Sweeney v. Max A.R. Matthews & Co., 46 111. 2d 64, 68, 264 N.E.2d 170, 172 (1970)
(trial court properly denied directed verdict for manufacturer grounded in assumption of risk
where evidence presented showed that journeyman carpenter was unaware of danger presented
by defective concrete nails).
55. Ralston v. Illinois Power Co., 13 111. App. 3d 95, 299 N.E.2d 497 (4th Dist. 1973)
(judgment for manufacturer as a matter of law; plaintiff assumed risk by standing on a dan-
gerous hydraulic boring attachment after admonishing his foreman several times about this
hazardous act); Fore v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 346, 287 N.E.2d 526 (3d Dist. 1972)
(summary judgment affirmed for manufacturer where plaintiff assumed risk of injury from
trencher machine after he had made many complaints to his employer concerning the inadequa-
cies of the brakes).
56. Prince v. Galis Mfg. Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 374 N.E.2d 1318 (3d Dist. 1978)
(summary judgment affirmed for manufacturer where experienced coal miner assumed risk of
injury from roofbolter machine because he had been warned by fellow employees of the
possibility of danger).
57. Kirby v. General Motors Corp., 10 I11. App. 3d 92, 293 N.E.2d 345 (4th Dist. 1973)
(summary judgment affirmed for manufacturer where truck driver was found to have assumed
risk because of previous difficulties with steering mechanism).
58. Prince v. Galis Mfg. Co., 58 I11. App. 3d 1056, 374 N.E.2d 1.318 (3d Dist. 1978).
59. 45 I11. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
60. Id. at 429, 261 N.E.2d at 311. The court decided that the question of assumption of risk
should have been decided by the jury, stating: "Plaintiff was an experienced 'operating engineer'
with proficiency in a wide range of machinery; a jury could have believed him aware of the
trencher's obvious design features." Id.
61. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
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Co., 6 1 emphasized that a plaintiff's indifference to apparent danger might
justify a judgment of assumption of risk as a matter of law."3
In both Williams and Sweeney, the supreme court weighed the effect of
other factors6 4 to determine whether the plaintiff should have known of the
danger. 5 Consonant with these precedents, the court in Thomas also should
have considered other factors. Because the plaintiff had a professional farm-
ing background and had fertilized farm lands for sixteen years, 6 it is difficult
to believe that Thomas had no awareness of the danger. Furthermore, the
applicator was a simple mechanism and Thomas possessed considerable ex-
perience using it.6 7 Hence, the argument that the plaintiff should have been
aware of the danger is a convincing one which the court should have ac-
cepted.68
The contention that the warning label failed to advise the plaintiff of the
specific defect in the apparatus also should not have precluded the defense of
assumption of risk. The decision in Williams indicated that assumption of
risk applies when the plaintiff knows of a dangerous condition, rather than
the existence of a particular defect.' In a similar Illinois decision, the
plaintiff was barred from recovery because he knew of the open and obvious
danger, yet was unaware of any specific defects. 70 In another case, the court
held that the plaintiff's general knowledge of the danger was sufficient to
62. 46 Ill. 2d 64, 264 N.E.2d 170 (1970).
63. Id. at 67, 264 N.E.2d at 172. The court, however, ultimately held that the plaintiff had
not assumed the risk, but only because he had had very little experience as a carpenter and,
therefore, did not realize the danger.
64. See note 10 supra.
65. The appellate court in Thomas similarly reasoned that plaintiff, due to his prior experi-
ence, was aware of the dangerous propensities of the fertilizer despite his allegation that he
possessed no such knowledge. 74 111. App. 3d at 527, 392 N.E.2d at 1146. See Keeton, Assump-
tion oJ Products Risks, 19 Sw. L.J. 61 (1965). This article enumerates the elements of assumption
of risk, and, significantly, notes that where the danger in a product is obvious, a plaintiff's
contention of lack of knowledge will be disregarded. Professor Keeton states that this position
makes the test for assumption of risk more objective, although it still retains its subjective
character in that it is based on an individual plaintiff's knowledge rather than the knowledge of
a reasonable, prudent person. Id. at 70-71.
66. See note 37 and accompanying test supra.
67. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
68. As aptly stated by the attorney for Kaiser:
If ever there was an experienced person with complete knowledge of the circum-
stances and of the dangers, it is the plaintiff in this case. . . . It is hard to imagine a
situation in which there would be any person (including all of the defendants and
counterdefendants) who would have more knowledge of the circumstances than does
the plaintiff here.
Brief for Defendant at 17, Thomas v. Kaiser Agricultural Chems., 81111. 2d 206, 407 N.E,2d 32
(1980).
69. 45 Ill. 2d at 426, 261 N.E.2d at 309.
70. Denton v. Bachtold Bros., 8 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1040, 291 N.E.2d 229, 231 (4th Dist.
1972). In Denton, the plaintiff sustained injuries from his lawn mower after he knowingly
removed the safety guards. The court ruled in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the
product itself was not defective and that the plaintiff assumed any risk in connection with his
injury. Id.
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impose the defense of assumption of risk, although it was not argued that
plaintiff was aware of the particular manufacturing defect alleged. 7' These
decisions under Illinois law indicate that the identification of a specific
danger is not necessary to establish the defense of assumption of risk. Rather,
the general awareness of a potential harm satisfies the requirement that the
plaintiff must have knowledge of the risk.
A better approach to the defense of assumption of risk, and its requisite
element of knowledge, is contained in the opinion of the Texas Civil Appel-
late Court in Heil Co. v. Grant.72 The Heil court stated that "assumption of
risk is premised upon knowledge of the dangerous condition of a product
rather than recognition of its defectiveness." 7 1 The court further main-
tained that the requirement of knowledge of risk pertains not to the actual
defective components that cause the injury, but to the plaintiff's general
awareness of the possible danger of some injury.74 The requisite element of
knowledge used in this general sense affords a more equitable interpretation
of the term because it recognizes those instances where a plaintiff appreciates
a general danger, yet nevertheless proceeds with his or her activities. Apply-
ing the Heil rationale, the plaintiff in Thomas exhibited both an awareness
and an appreciation of a dangerous condition. 75 Thomas himself testified
that he had read the instructions on the warning label. 7 Because he possessed
the necessary maturity and experience 77 to understand that disregarding
instructions concerning a potentially dangerous apparatus could create a
hazardous situation, he undoubtedly must have been aware of the risk.
The majority's second argument was that the plaintiff did not voluntarily
choose to embrace a known danger, 78 a requisite element of the defense of
assumption of risk.79  There must be an indication of conscious deliberation,
resulting in an injury, which is not satisfied by mere inadvertence or momen-
71. Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008, 1015-16 (7th Cir. 1973) (applying Illinois
law) (plaintiff sustained injuries when attempting to operate controls of forklift while standing
on a platform below the forks).
72. 534 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976). The Heil case involved a situation where the
raised bed of a dump truck was accidentally lowered, crushing the decedent who was working
beneath the bed. It was the decedent himself who inadvertently tripped the pullout cable that
lowered the bed. The court held that the decedent appreciated the danger of triggering the
pullout cable even though he had never previously worked on the dump truck. Id. at 922.
73. Id. at 921.
74. Id. at 922.
75. A factually similar case is Sherrill v. Royal Indus., Inc., 526 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1975), in
which the 55 year old plaintiff, a farmer for most of his life, was injured by a grain auger. The
plaintiff had assembled the unit, observed its operation when used by neighbors, and had used
the unit himself once before. Although the plaintiff claimed that the auger had a defective
design, the court denied the manufacturer's liability, stating that the jury properly found that
the plaintiff had assumed the risk. Id. at 512.
76. 81111. 2d at 212, 407 N.E.2d at 35.
77. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
78. 81 111. 2d at 214, 407 N.E.2d at 36.
79. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
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tary inattention." Moreover, split-second decisions in emergency situations
do not constitute voluntary decisions. 81 It must be emphasized, though, that
unreasonableness and involuntariness pertain only to the mental decision to
face a known danger, and not to the physical conduct involved in conjunc-
tion with the decision. 82 The plaintiff's consideration of the potential dan-
ger is the crucial factor, rather than the manner in which he carries out his
decision. Furthermore, the fact that a decision to assume a known risk may
be foolhardy or hasty is irrelevant in determining whether there was an
assumption of risk because the important question is whether conscious
deliberation took place. The standard focuses on whether a decision was
made at all-not whether the decision was either intelligent or correct. 83
When such reasoning is applied to the facts of Thomas, it is clear that the
plaintiff made a voluntary conscious decision to accept a risk. He
deliberately decided to proceed without first checking the air pressure gauge.
Since he knew that the instructions told him to check the gauge first, his
conscious decision to disregard the instructions is controlling, rather than his
subsequent conduct of inadvertently depressing the check relief valve.
Hence, the third and final element of assumption of risk has been fulfilled.
There is no foundation, therefore, for the majority's assertion that Thomas
did not assume the risk of injury. He possessed the requisite knowledge of the
danger from his past experience in working with these chemicals. He was
expressly warned of the risk of the fertilizer escaping by the warning label he
had read prior to the injury. And, his conscious decision to ignore the
instructions on the use of the applicator constituted a voluntary decision to
take the risk. For these reasons, the court should have decided that Thomas
assumed the risk as a matter of law.
80. Scott v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 26 Ill. App. 3d 971, 990-91, 326 N.E.2d 74, 87 (lst
Dist. 1975) (no assumption of risk where plaintiff's contact with foot pedal on press machine was
inadvertent). See PRossen, supra note 1, § 68, at 450-52 (stating that the plaintiff must have
freedom of choice to be bound by assumption of risk). If there is no choice, or if the choice is
between two evils, the voluntariness aspect is destroyed and, hence, assumption of risk will not
apply to bar a plaintiff's claim.
81. Coty v. U.S. Slicing Mach. Co., 58 I11. App. 3d 237, 246, 373 N.E.2d 1371, 1378 (2d
Dist. 1978) (15 year old girl did not assume risk of injury when she impulsively attempted to
prevent juice from splattering and inadvertently cut her hand on meat slicer); Collins v.
Musgrave, 28 I11. App. 3d 307, 313, 328 N.E.2d 649, 653 (5th Dist. 1975) (truck driver did not
voluntarily assume risk by pulling into driveway rather than remaining on highway when faced
with emergency-broken rear axle).
82. Johnson v. Clark Equip. Co., 272 Or. 403, 413, 547 P.2d 132, 140 (1976) (court
remanded case where trial judge excluded evidence concerning employee's decision to encounter
a known risk; employee was injured when forklift carriage descended while he reached through
the uprights in an attempt to cut the bands on fork lift bundles). This reasoning has been used in
other decisions, such as Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1973) (applying
Illinois law), where the plaintiff made a hasty but nonetheless knowing decision to assume the
risk of injury while operating the controls of his forklift when dangerously standing on the
moving forks.
83. Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008, 1016 (7th Cir. 1973) (applying Illinois law)
("[t]he test, although subjective, relates to the knowledge of the risk and not to whether it was a
good risk").
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The Defense of Misuse
A second defense commonly utilized to deal with a plaintiff's disregard of
instructions is that of misuse. This defense, though not raised in Thomas,
should be examined because it remains a viable alternative and may be
employed successfully in future situations similar to Thomas. Misuse is de-
fined as the use of a product "for a purpose neither intended nor 'foreseeable'
(objectively reasonable) by the defendant."' 4 In order to establish misuse as
a defense,85 it must be proved that the plaintiff's use of the product was
unforeseeable to the manufacturer.8 6  Manufacturers possess a justifiable
expectation that their instructions will be read and followed. If they are
disregarded, the general rule is that a vendor should not be held liable for
such abnormal use.87 Further, if a product is safe to use when directions are
followed, the product will be considered neither unreasonably dangerous nor
defective, 88 thus undercutting a strict products liability action.
Disregard of clear instructions is the basis for many decisions in favor of
manufacturers. For example, recovery may be denied when it is demon-
strated that a farm implement was operated in a manner contrary to the
given instructions.8" Similarly, some courts have indicated that strict liabil-
ity plaintiffs may not knowingly ignore plain and unambiguous instructions,
and these courts have extended the applicability of this doctrine to include
most goods sold to the public.9 0 More recently, because a consumer used
84. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 111. 2d 418, 425, 261 N.E.2d 305, 309 (1970) (paren-
theses in original). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment h (1965) (stating that
the seller is not liable where injury results from the abnormal use of a non-defective product).
85. Although the issue of misuse of the applicator by Thomas was not raised on appeal by
either of the defendants, it was examined by Justice Ryan's dissent and should be raised by future
defendants as an alternative argument. However, the third-party defendant, Dover, did raise
this issue, but only in regard to Kaiser's alleged misuse in assembling the applicator. Dover did
not claim that Thomas misused the product by not following the written directions on the proper
operation of the applicator. See notes 38, 41 & 47 supra.
86. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
87. PRossER, supra note 1, § 102, at 669.
88. This notion was set forth in the Restatement: "Where warning is given the seller may
reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which
is safe for use if it is followed, is not in a defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment j (1965).
89. Walk v. J.I. Case Co., 36 A.D.2d 60, 318 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1971) (plaintiff injured while
removing husks from a corn picking machine barred from recovery on alternative grounds of
misuse and assumption of risk).
90. See Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v. Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). In
that case, the defendant was barred from recovery on the basis of misuse because she violated the
instructions of a home permanent hair wave product by leaving the solution on her hair for twice
the recommended length of time. Regarding the misuse issue, the court stated:
We do not believe that the strict liability doctrine means that under circumstances
such as we have here a consumer may knowingly violate the plain, unambiguous
instructions and ignore the warnings, then hold the makers, distributors and sellers
of a product liable in the face of the obvious misuse of the product.
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cleaning fluid in concentrations greater than those recommended on the
label, recovery from the manufacturer was denied on the basis of blatant
misuse.9 Hence, the general rule of these cases should be applicable to the
facts of Thomas. In each of the examples, the plaintiff sustained injury after
failing to comply with given instructions, exactly as occurred in Thomas.
Failure to heed instructions has also been held to constitute misuse under
Illinois law. One example is Stewart v. Von Solbrig Hospital,9 2 where a
plaintiff's disregard of specific instructions from his own doctor concerning a
surgical pin prompted the court to rule as a matter of law that such misuse
precluded any recovery under strict liability. Thus, courts are free to rule for
defendants on the issue of disregarding express instructions, and it would
behoove defendants to employ this defense in situations similar to Thomas.
The only remaining question concerns the reasonable foreseeability of the
plaintiff's disregard of the instructions. Certainly, in many cases the misuse
of equipment could and should be anticipated. In Thomas, however, the
facts were unique because the plaintiff was not an ordinary consumer but
rather was a professional farmer employing one of the implements of his
trade. That the plaintiff in Thomas was a professional farmer supports the
argument that any misuse on his part would be unforeseeable. In one case
involving the failure of an aircraft engine, 3 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that a trained pilot should have
realized that malfunction had occurred in his airplane and avoided the
injury by aborting the take-off. The pilot's disregard of a detailed instruction
manual regarding pre-flight safety checks was not deemed to be a reasonably
foreseeable misuse. Therefore, the manufacturer was not held liable as a
matter of law.9 4 The court emphasized the utter unforeseeability of a pilot's
disregard of basic safety precautions.9 5
Id. at 780. See also McDevitt v. Standard Oil Co. of Tex., 391 F.2d 364, 370 (5th Cir. 1968)
(plaintiff barred from recovery by defense of misuse since he did not purchase the proper size
tires, and tires were sometimes inflated well above recommended pressures and other times well
below recommended pressures). See generally Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Con-
tributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REv. 93, 100-03 (1972). Noel observes
that when there is no clear evidence that the plaintiff has read the instructions, courts have often
ruled that this failure to follow directions is merely contributory negligence rather than assump-
tion of risk. But when the directions were in fact read and understood, courts have ruled that the
disregard of instructions is assumption of risk and bars recovery. Id.
91. Evershine Prods., Inc. v. Schmitt, 130 Ga. App. 34, 202 S.E.2d 228 (1973). It should be
noted that the plaintiff did not sue under a strict liability theory, but rather under the theory of a
breach of implied and express warranties. However, the analysis regarding misuse is applicable
to either of these theories. See R. HURsH, AMERiCAN LAW OF PRODuCTs LIABILITY
§ 3:84, at 632-33 (1974) (a manufacturer is not liable under a warranty theory if the breach
occurs as the result of a misuse of the product).
92. 24 I11. App. 3d 599, 321 N.E.2d 428 (lst Dist. 1974). A surgical pin had been placed in
the plaintiff's leg, and he was expressly warned not to walk on the leg without a cast while the
bone was still mending.
93. Kay v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 548 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1977).
94. Id. at 1374.
95. Id. at 1373.
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An Illinois case similarly decided involved injuries to an experienced
sportsman.96 The plaintiff, an archery enthusiast, improperly attached a
bow string silencer and frequently used the device during target practice.
Both actions were contrary to explicit instructions. The court held that the
jury could properly conclude this constituted misuse of the product and
plaintiff's recovery, therefore, was precluded.97
Such reasoning is particularly applicable to Thomas because the plaintiff
had been a professional farmer for many years. Arguably, a layperson could
foreseeably misuse the equipment, but to extend this argument and claim
that a knowledgeable professional would also foreseeably misuse the product
is beyond reason. The defense of misuse, therefore, should be applied in
future cases similar to Thomas where a reasonable consumer would be
adequately protected by following instructions.
Negating Plaintiff's Claim that the
Product Was Unreasonably Dangerous
A third alternative defense available to litigants rests on the widely ac-
cepted notion that a manufacturer is not required to market a product totally
safe in all contexts. 98  The manufacturer is bound only to avoid creating
"unreasonably" dangerous products. 9  Unreasonableness is measured by the
expectations of that segment of the population in which the goods are mar-
keted. 100
A prime example of this reasoning is found in a Fifth Circuit case in which
the court held that an experienced boat captain could not claim that the
positioning of a winch, which enhanced the tangling of line, was unreason-
ably dangerous.10' Since this danger was obviously perceived by the com-
munity of potential consumers (professional seamen), the court ruled that the
danger was not unreasonable under the circumstances. 0 2 The main issue
96. Genteman v. Saunders Archery Co., 42 Ill. App. 3d 294, 355 N.E.2d 647 (lst Dist.
1976).
97. Id. at 299, 355 N.E.2d at 651-52.
98. See Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 211, 384 N.E.2d 368, 372 (1978) (manufacturer of
highway sign not liable where motorist drove into the sign since injuries did not result from
defect in product). See also Denton v. Bachtold Bros., Inc., 8 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1040, 291
N.E.2d 229, 231 (4th Dist. 1972) (judgment for manufacturer as a matter of law where plaintiff
received injuries from his lawn mower only after he had knowingly removed the safety guards).
99. The Restatement states that strict products liability applies only where products are
unreasonably dangerous because many goods cannot be made entirely free from harm. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i (1965).
100. Id. This Comment provides: "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics." Id. Although other
parts of Comment i have been adopted in Illinois, see, e.g., Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill.
2d 456, 467, 343 N.E.2d 465, 471 (1976), this particular sentence has not been discussed in any
Illinois cases.
101. Williams v. Brasea, Inc., 497 F.2d 67, 78 (5th Cir. 1974).
102. Id. The plaintiff also contended that the winch was unreasonably dangerous because it
lacked a brake. The court, however, again barred recovery as a matter of law, stating: "The
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before the court was not whether the installation of the winch was dan-
gerous, but whether it had become unreasonably dangerous in the particular
setting. Similarly, the relationship between the professional character of the
participants and the reasonableness of a defective condition was considered
an important factor in a case involving adequate warning signs for toxic
chemicals. 0 3 The determination of the reasonableness of the defect in that
case rested upon a consideration of the knowledge and expertise of the
expected users of these chemicals.' 0 4 Thus, since a group of professionals of
presumed expertise and intelligence were the intended consumers of the
good, the court ruled that warnings understood only by such people were
sufficient to justify the decision that the product was not unreasonably
dangerous. By analogy, the fact that the fertilizer applicator in Thomas was
distributed only to a select class of professional patrons justifies the conclu-
sion that the product was riot unreasonably dangerous.
Further support for this conclusion is founded on another case strikingly
similar to Thomas. In Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.,10 5 a
professional crane operator was specifically instructed against operating the
crane within six feet of any electrical power lines. Despite these warnings,
the plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of contacting the power lines with
the crane. 0 Plaintiff sued under a strict liability theory, alleging that the
design was defective because the manufacturer had failed to incorporate
safety devices to guard against such an occurrence. 07
The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, rejected this argument. It ruled
instead that no liability arises when the product is safe if used in accordance
with the instructions. 08  Because the evidence indicated that the risk was
known to the professional crane operator, and because specific warnings
danger posed by the lack of a brake could scarcely be beyond the contemplation of crewmen who
knew of its absence and worked with the winch in that condition on a daily basis." Id. at 79.
103. In Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1976), a strict products
liability suit was brought by the widow of the decedent who was overcome by noxious fumes
while stripping a barge. The widow alleged that a small warning on the exterior of the barge was
not adequate to advise of the dangerous properties of the chemicals found within the barge. The
court, however, ruled in favor of the manufacturer, stating that the manufacturer "was entitled
to rely on the professional expertise of those who could reasonably be expected to come in contact
with its product, and to tailor is warnings accordingly." Id. at 466.
104. Id. at 465. The same analysis and conclusion is found in Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v.
Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968). In Pruitt, a plaintiff-con-
sumer was denied recovery for chemical burns to her hair and scalp because the product was
intended to be sold solely to professional beauticians. The court held that the product was not in
an unreasonably dangerous defective condition in the hands of a professional who would have
known to take certain precautions. Therefore, such knowledge would have prevented the
plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 857.
105. 307 Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303 (1976).
106. Id. at 50, 240 N.W.2d at 304-05.
107. Id. at 50-51, 240 N.W.2d at 304-05.
108. Id. at 56-57, 240 N.W.2d at 308.
.[Vol. 30:477
1981] THOMAS
advised against the encountered danger, the court ruled that the product was
not in an unreasonably dangerous condition-despite the absence of safety
features. 0 9
Thus, when a professional person possessing superior knowledge fails to
follow instructions, such person cannot thereafter claim that the injury
occurred as the result of an unreasonably dangerous condition of the prod-
uct. Common sense dictates that where an injury results only under such
unpredictable circumstances, the product itself is not unreasonably dan-
gerous in any sense. This reasoning should compel a different judgment in
cases similar to Thomas where a professional worked with a device in his or
her professional capacity. Under these circumstances, a court should rule as a
matter of law that the device is not in an unreasonably dangerous defective
condition.
IMPACT OF THE THOMAS DECISION
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Thomas could well have a sub-
stantial economic effect upon the future of business in the state. During the
1970's, a staggering increase occurred in both the number of product liability
suits filed and the amount of damages sought, due primarily to the advent of
the strict liability theory. 110 With these increases, manufacturers were
forced to retool their shops in response to the demand for safety in both
manufacturing and product engineering. Nevertheless, businessmen still
were not able to prevent the massive escalation in litigation and, as a result,
suffered an unparalleled inflation in their insurance rates."' If the outcome
109. Id. at 58, 240 N.W.2d at 308. An Illinois appellate case indirectly supports the holding of
Halvorson. In Bittner v. Wheel Horse Prods, Inc., 28 Ill. App. 3d 44, 328 N.E.2d 160 (lst Dist.
1975), the owner of a snowblower suffered injuries after he disregarded emphatic directions not
to place his hand near the auger. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the manufac-
turer and a special verdict holding that the plaintiff did not assume the risk of injury. Id. at 49,
328 N.E.2d at 164. Because this case was brought under a strict liability theory for defective
design, it could not have been said that the defect existed outside of the control of the manufac-
turer. Id. at 46, 328 N.E.2d at 161-62. Furthermore, since there was no question that the
snowblower auger was a proximate cause of the injury, the only conclusion that the jury could
have reached was that the plaintiff had failed to meet his burden in proving the third element of
his cause of action, namely that the product was in an unreasonably dangerous defective
condition. Id. at 50, 328 N.E.2d at 164.
110. The number of product liability suits brought in United States District Courts increased
by 83% between the years 1974 and 1975. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE
ON PRODUCT LIABILITY-FINAL REPORT 11-44 (1978) [hereinafter cited as INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE]. A more recent task force survey has shown that the number of new claims filed has
stabilized somewhat since the 1975 peak to an average of between 11 and 12 claims per firm per
year, well above the 4.3 average per firm per year in 1971. Id. at 111-3. Nevertheless, the amount
sought in these new claims has skyrocketed, rising from an average of $476,000 per firm in 1971,
to over $1,711,000 per firm in 1976. Id.
111. A random study performed by the Interagency Task Force showed that in one industry
the average insurance premium rose 568% in one year. Id. at V-18. See notes 115-117 and
accompanying text infra.
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of Thomas is widely followed by the courts, a new round of increased
litigation and spiraling insurance premiums would be spurred. The unfortu-
nate aftermath would be that many marginally profitable businesses would
be forced to shut down or relocate outside of the state. In either situation, a
dreary picture is painted for the continued economic vitality of Illinois
businesses.
The ultimate victims of the Thomas ruling will not be the insurance
companies who pay out these claims, but businessmen and their patrons.
Although insurance companies experienced losses during the peak of the
product liability litigation," 2 simple economics teaches that their costs were
passed along to manufacturing industries in the form of higher premiums. In
turn, the manufacturers spread the costs among the general buying public
through higher prices." 3  However, these costs cannot always be passed
along, nor are they spread evenly among businesses and consumers. As a
result, the brunt of the impact of product liability litigation falls hardest on
the group who can least afford it-small businessmen.
Statistics compiled by the Interagency Task Force on Product Liability" 4
reveal that insurance premiums of business firms have risen on the average of
280% from 1971 to 1976."1 This increase is not evenly divided, though,
since the range of increases varied between 19% and 568% .'16 The data
unequivocally substantiated that small firms experienced greater premium
increases than large firms." 7 Hence, small firms surviving on small profit
margins may be squeezed out of the market due to rising insurance pre-
miums."' The same serious fate awaits newly developed product lines as
112. In 1975, insurance companies incurred $116 in losses for every $100 received in pre-
miums, no doubt the primary reason for continually rising insurance rates. INA CORP., PRODUCT
LIABILITY: SOME PROFESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 5 (1976).
113. For a simple, yet accurate description of the economics of product liability litigation, see
Oi, Products Liability & Industrial Safety, in U.S. DEP'T oF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY-SELECTED PAPERS 392-407 (1978).
114. This task force, under the direction of the United States Commerce Department, was
created for the primary purpose of studying rising product liability costs and the difficulties
faced by many firms in obtaining product liability insurance coverage. INTERAGENCY TASK
FORCE, supra note 110, at V-17.
115. Id. at 111-2. Other studies done by the Machinery and Allied Institute show that over
90% of all respondents to its surveys experienced increased product liability insurance costs. Id.
at V-19. Furthermore, statistics gathered by the Interagency Task Force show that 86% of the
firms surveyed carry some form of product liability coverage. Id. at 111-2.
The cost of coverage varies with each industry. The industrial machinery industry expends
between 2.0% and 7.3% of its total sales revenue for product liability insurance. This figure is in
sharp contrast to that of ladder manufacturers. That industry pays up to 23.55 % of its total sales
revenue to procure product liability insurance. Id. at VI-16.
116. Id. at V-18.
117. Id. at V-19.
118. See Sabin, Product Liability-The Counterattack Has Begun!, 58 CHI. B. REC. 313, 320
(1977). The author states that the advent of strict products liability has created a "crisis"
situation for manufacturers. He contends that the continually expanding field of products
liability and the willingness of juries to render substantially higher awards have had a severe
financial impact upon product-related industries, very similar to the malpractice crisis faced by
doctors and hospitals.
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well. If insurance rates rise to the level where the potential income of a new
line barely generates a profit, financial institutions might refuse to offer
capital for such a risky venture."19 The buying public would, thus, suffer by
losing both a new line of innovative products and by paying more for existing
goods. 120
Evidence of the magnitude of this economic problem is shown by the
uncommon number of legislative changes demanded by pro-business groups.
The establishment of the White House Conference on Product Liability,' 2'
the founding of new lobby organizations such as Retort, Inc.,' 12 2 and the
creation of the Interagency Task Force on Product Liability demonstrates the
interest generated by the development of strict products liability law and the
effect of that law on our national economy. The efforts of these groups have
not been in vain, for small though important changes have appeared in the
law of product liability. One example is the promulgation of the Uniform
Product Liability Act, 123 which, if adopted, would especially benefit manu-
facturers in situations analogous to Thomas. 2 4 The Illinois Legislature has
also taken a large first step to alleviate the economic burden on manufac-
turers by placing a new time constraint on the period in which strict products
liability suits may be brought. 125 In Thomas, however, the Illinois Supreme
Court displayed a very narrow perspective on the problems associated with
strict products liability suits. Unfortunately, instead of promoting a benefi-
119. See I. GRAY, PRODUcr LIABILITY: A MANAGEMENT RESPONSE 26-28 (1975). The author
points out that strict products liability has had a serious detrimental effect upon manufacturers
due to the fact that insurance has not adequately buffered businessmen against financial burdens
imposed by these suits. Id. at 121-50.
120. See Who Pays?, FoRas, Aug. 1, 1976, at 57, col. 2 (Frederick D. Watkins, President of
Aetna Insurance Co., stated in an interview that a stricter statute of limitations, as well as a
ceiling on "pain and suffering" awards, is needed in order to protect businesses from the baneful
effect of strict products liability suits).
121. The conference convened in March, 1976, and consisted of officials from various govern-
mental and private sector organizations. See Sabin, Product Liability- The Counterattack Has
Begun!, 58 CHI. B. REc. 313, 319-20 (1977).
122. Id. at 318. The organization's name stems from the slogan "Reason and Equity in Tort."
Its purposes are to analyze all aspects of product liability and to pursue legislation which will
remedy the inequitable laws in this area. Id.
123. 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714-50 (1979).
124. Section 112(A)(2) of the Act, entitled Claimant's Failure to Observe an Apparent Defec-
tive Condition, would eliminate the issue of whether a plaintiff was subjectively aware of the
risk of a particular danger when considering the defense of assumption of risk. The model
approach would focus on the knowledge that an ordinary reasonably prudent person would have
in the same situation.
125. One Illinois statutory provision requires that all personal injury actions, including strict
liability suits, be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues. ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 83, § 15 (1979). The Statute of Repose, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.2 (b) (1979), however,
specifically applies only to the time in which an action for a strict products liability suit may be
brought. This statute, enacted in 1978, provides that any such actions must be commenced
within 12 years from the date of the first sale or delivery of the product by the manufacturer, or
within ten years from the original date of sale or delivery to the initial consumer, whichever
period expires earlier. Id.
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cial public policy, the court actually undermined the needs and demands of
manufacturers as well as consumers by effectively limiting the use of assump-
tion of risk in the area of strict products liability.
CONCLUSION
In Thomas, the Illinois Supreme Court wrestled with the problem of
whether the failure to follow directions concerning the proper use of a
product constituted a defense to a strict products liability action. The court
rejected the defense of assumption of risk, ruling in favor of the injured
plaintiff. The Thomas holding is unfortunate in that it takes an unnecessarily
limited view of this appropriate defense to strict products liability and effec-
tively restricts future defendants to the defenses of misuse and negating the
claim that the product was in an unreasonably dangerous condition. Fur-
thermore, the court apparently has held that manufacturers may provide
adequate instructions about the manner in which a product may be used, yet
be subjected to liability when users fail to heed the instructions. Not only
does such a result effectively condone dangerous conduct on the part of
consumers, but it also places an undeserved and unreasonable burden upon
businessmen and the general public in the form of rising insurance premiums
and escalating product prices. The court's unrestrained application of strict
products liability, therefore, has created a precedent which not only ignores
the needs and demands of business, but also obfuscates the law of strict
products liability.
Peter P. Rill, Jr.
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